The new DDoS: Unicode confusables can't fool LLMs, but they can 5x your API bill Can pixel-identical Unicode homoglyphs fool LLM contract review? I tested 8 attack types against GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and others with 130+ API calls. The models read through every substitution. But confusable characters fragment into multi-byte BPE tokens, turning a failed comprehension attack into a 5x billing attack. Call it Denial of Spend.
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// Decode on CPU
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const origSet = srcObjDesc.set;